Uskominen ja luottamus. Kaksi tulkintaa maailmavarmuuden luonteesta
Belief and Trust. Two Interpretations of the Concept of Protodoxa
This article offers two different interpretations of the concept of protodoxa or primordial faith as used by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty: a cognitivistic interpretation and an existential interpretation. It argues that Merleau-Ponty's understanding of our primary relation to reality is influenced by Husserl's late manuscripts, on the one hand, and by Kierkegaard's discussion of religious faith, on the other hand. For Merleau-Ponty, primoridal faith is not a propositional attitude, belief or judgment but an affective sensory relation that we have to the perceivable world. The paper ends in a description of the basic structures of the world encountered in this fundamental attitude or relation. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is not a set of objects but a texture of affective qualities.
